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Ethnic Dualism and Communication Costs –
Explaining Segmentation and Wage Inertia*
1. A Model of Ethnic Dualism: Introduction and Summary
In December 1999, the Council of the European Union decided to enlarge the group of candi-
dates to membership. In addition to ongoing talks with Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic,
Estonia, Slovenia and Cyprus, the EU will open negotiations with Bulgaria, Latvia, Lithuania,
Romania, Slovakia and Malta. Furthermore, the status of a candidate for membership is also
conferred on Turkey, without immediate negotiations, though.
The enlargement process is being followed with particular attention in Germany. Membership
of the EU means freedom to settle and to trade. Germany and Austria will naturally have to
bear the brunt of any large immigration wave that follows. A large majority of all immigrants
from South Eastern Europe already residing in the EU are living in one of these tangential
countries. In addition, more than 2 million Turkish nationals living in Germany might act as a
bridgehead for massive immigration from that region, too. Judging from the past, it is unlikely
that these immigrants would integrate quickly. What would be the consequences for the
German labour market? Are there any special features of "ethnic dualism"?
This essay puts forward a new way of thinking about dualistic structures, centring on ethnic
differences and the resulting communication costs between agents. If two types of labour are
not perfect substitutes, there are comparative advantages that may be exploited by division of
labour. If there are no further interactions between members of the labour force, it will always
be efficient to employ both types jointly in the same production unit. Dividing labour, how-
ever, means coordinating work effort and in order to do this, agents must communicate. This
will not be costless, and communication between people from different cultural backgrounds
is more difficult, takes more time and may involve a higher risk of misunderstanding and con-
flict than communication between people sharing the same culture.
High communication costs will lead to efficient sorting. There will be firms that specialise in
employing mainly one type of labour. A dualistic industrial structure will result from the
ethnic cleavage. Segregation, however, will probably not be complete: the marginal produc-
tivity of a factor might increase when it gets scarcer. Hence, it will usually be inefficient for
firms to dispense with one type of labour completely.
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2On the firm level, high communication costs render certain factor proportions inefficient and
firms will never use them. This, however, makes aggregate technology linear within these
bounds. If aggregate supply of labour changes, substitution will not take place by firms
smoothly adapting their factor intensities to changing prices, but by two efficiently producing
sectors adapting their output quantities. Ideally, no wage reaction at all is necessary to restore
equilibrium.
Fig. 1 demonstrates the basic argument. The bold line shows the unit isoquant of a representa-
tive firm, factors A and B being the labour input from workers of different ethnic origin. Be-
cause of communication costs, technology on the firm level will be non-convex, and firms
will not use the input vectors along the line Iz  to IIz . The aggregate input requirement set,
however, is given by the convex hull of the representative firm’s set. If aggregate endowment
happens to lie in the cone defined by Iz  and IIz , these two unit activities will be used
simultaneously in equilibrium. Changing aggregate factor supply will be accommodated by a
changing intensity of their usage, and factor prices will not change, nor will the set of efficient
activities. In other words: as a result of efficient sorting, the aggregate isoquant will have a
linear portion.
2. An Empirical Puzzle: Why Do Wages Seem Invariant to Migration?
In order to measure the impact of migration on the wage structure of the recipient country, one
ideally would like to observe random streams of migrants into otherwise closed labour mar-
kets. The work of Grossman (1982) was the first of a whole series of studies taking this ap-
proach. Typically, a city or metropolitan area is treated as a closed labour market and the re-
searcher performs regressions between different wage rates on one hand and the number of
migrants on the other. Quite regularly, the outcome indicates that migration has almost no ef-
fect on native wages. Borjas (1994) and Greenwood and McDowel (1986) survey the literature
on the US labour market, see, for example, Borjas (1990) or Altonij and Card (1991). The
point estimates of the elasticity of wage rates to immigration cluster around -0.01 to -0.02.  If
a city has 10 per cent more immigrants than another, the native wage in that city is only about
0.2 per cent lower.  This numerically weak relationship is "observed across all types of native
workers, white or black, skilled or unskilled, male or female".1 Zimmermann and Bauer
(1999) give an extended review of the relatively recent literature on West European labour
markets. Overwhelmingly, these studies conclude that the wage effects of immigration are
negligible or non-existent and – in some cases – even positive. Examples are the contributions
by Pischke and Velling (1994), Winter-Ebmer and Zweimüller (1996), Velling (1995), Bauer
(1998) and the comprehensive study by Boeri and Brückner (2001). Taking an entirely
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3different approach, Gang and Rivera-Batiz (1994) reach the same conclusions. De New and
Zimmermann (1994) find substantial negative effects, but seem to remain the exception.
It has been argued by Borjas and others that migration flows are not exogenous and the ob-
served labour markets are not closed. Migrants have strong incentives to choose that local la-
bour market which offers the best economic perspectives. Natives, for their part, may move to
neighbouring labour markets and thereby mask the aggregate significance of migration. If na-
tives and migrants eliminate the differences between local labour markets, the observed corre-
lations have no structural interpretation. This problem cannot be solved completely by using
instrumental variable techniques.
Card (1990) reports a convincing natural experiment that calls into question the validity of
this argument. Probably in order to put political pressure on the US, Fidel Castro unexpectedly
declared on April 20, 1980 that anyone who wished to do so could leave Cuba via the port of
Mariel. Between the months of May and September 1980, about 125,000 Cuban immigrants
reached the port of Miami in a fleet of small boats. About half of them stayed permanently in
Miami. Almost overnight, the city’s labour force had grown by 7%, and the number of Cuban
migrants by 20%.
These new migrants were mostly unskilled and barely spoke any English.2 In his study, Card
traces the development of the wage structure in Miami and four neighbouring cities. Table 2
gives a first impression. For all ethnic groups, wages in Miami were lower than in comparable
cities. The incomes of Blacks, of Whites and of Hispanics (without Cubans) stayed constant in
Miami, whereas they tended to fall in the control group.
The wages of Cuban immigrants did decline, by 7% between 1979 and 1981. However, Card
shows that this is almost entirely the consequence of a particularly low skill level on the part
of the Mariel immigrants, whose wages were about 34% less than wages of other Cuban im-
migrants. In effect, the newcomers diluted the skill level of the entire group. Card undertakes
a careful analysis of the wage dynamics, controlling for the changing qualification structure
and finally states that a comparison of Cuban wages inside and outside the Miami labour
market does not provide any evidence of a widening wage differential during the years
following the influx of the Mariel immigrants. There was no worsening of the earnings of
native low skilled workers either.
A violent expansion of the labour force by 7% due to the influx of almost exclusively low
skilled immigrants from one single source country had no effect on wages or unemployment
rates! Of course, it may be the case that earnings of less qualified workers and Hispanics in
general and Cubans in particular would have increased, had the Mariel incident not taken
place. Card’s evidence does not point in this direction. His explanation centres on special fea-
                                                
2
 It even seems that Castro used this opportunity to empty the country’s prisons and mental hospitals.
4tures of the labour market of Miami. As a result of earlier waves of immigrants, an industry
structure had evolved that not only was tailored to the skills of Hispanic immigrants but made
communication costs irrelevant:
Two factors that may have been especially important in facilitating the absorption of the Mariel immi-
grants are related to the distinctive character of the Miami labour market. First, Miami’s industry
structure was well suited to make use of an influx of unskilled labour. This structure, and particularly the
high concentration of textile and apparel industries, evolved over the previous two decades in response
to earlier waves of immigrants and may have allowed the Mariel immigrants to take up unskilled jobs as
earlier Cuban immigrants moved to better ones. Second, because of the high concentration of Hispanics
in Miami, the lack of English-speaking ability among the Mariels may have had smaller effects than
could be expected for other immigrants in other cities. 3
The following sections will work out in a stylised, but formal way what the interplay of com-
parative advantages and communication costs might mean for the industry structure and its
capacity to absorb migrants.
3. Communication Costs and Convexity
A convincing analytical foundation for the convexity assumption in labour economics is pre-
sented in an essay by Rosen (1978) on the division of labour, refining a model of international
trade by Dornbusch, Fisher and Samuelson (1977). If there are a variety of tasks that must be
assigned to two different types of workers, these tasks can be ordered by decreasing compara-
tive advantages of one group with respect to the other. An efficient work assignment involves
allocating tasks to workers in the order indicated by their comparative advantage. Consider a
movement down the isoquant, where successively workers of type A are substituted against
workers of type B. In order to replace one unit of A labour, ever more units of B are needed as
the comparative advantage of type B for the last task becomes smaller and smaller. Thus, the
rate of technical substitution falls. If there is a continuum of tasks to be performed, and com-
parative advantages are described by a twice-differentiable function, the familiar neoclassical,
strictly convex and differentiable isoquant obtains.
Rosen’s theoretical account abstracts from the need to coordinate and other interactions be-
tween workers. Becker and Murphy (1992) point out that the various costs resulting from the
co-ordination of specialised activities in effect impose a limit to the realisation of gains from
labour division. This repeats an argument made earlier by McManus (1985) in his fundamen-
tal study on the costs of linguistic heterogeneity: if the languages of two groups of agents
differ, they are unable to reap all the efficiency gains that could be realised by labour division,
given their different skill endowment.
Linguistic deficits reduce the productivity of workers. McManus (1985) investigates the
earning losses for Hispanics in the USA and estimates their present value to be $36,000 for
the most disadvantaged group. Kossoudij (1988) and Chiswick (1991) also detect high losses
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5accruing to immigrants due to their lack of proficiency in English. Lazear (1999) points out
that the losses from not knowing the majority language might be inversely related to the
relative size of a minority group.
In order to analyse the consequences of ethnic dualism on the labour market, it is crucial to
see that the convexity of technology on the firm level will be lost if the costs of communica-
tion between workers of two different types are sufficiently high. If workers are separated at
different production sites – without any labour division whatsoever – there will be no costs of
communication resulting from cultural interferences either. These will occur as soon as
workers of different ethnic type are employed jointly in the same production unit. If the costs
of co-ordination are sufficiently high, the maximum output resulting from labour division is
not higher, but lower than the output attainable at separate productions sites. The efficiency
gains resulting from the division of labour are more than outweighed.
In order to model ethnic dualism and explain the low elasticity of wages, we employ a simple
but powerful basic hypothesis: Between workers of different ethnicity there are co-ordination
costs that do not exist between members of the same group.
4. A Model of Ethnic Division
4.1 Production Plans and Production Sets
Suppose a single consumption good is produced by firms J,,1j K= , with 2J ≥ . The produc-
tion plan of firm j is characterised by:
3
j R∈y  , with ( )jjjj ,, BAQ −−=y  .
Here, jQ  is the output. The entries jA  and jB  are quantities of labour input by workers of
nationality A and B, respectively. Following the convention, they enter with a negative sign.
Using another vector, the input:
2
j R∈z  , with ( )jjj , BA=z ,
we can write the production plan as ( )jj , z−Q .
All producers use the same technology. The set of production plans available to producers is
their common production set NY . A production plan in NY  is called technologically feasible.
The production set can be described by a production function, R:f 2N →Ω . The set 2Ω  is
the nonnegative orthant, i.e., the production function is defined for all ( )0,0j ≥z . A produc-
tion plan ( )jjj , zy −= Q  is contained in NY  if and only if ( )jNj f z≤Q , in short:
( ) }fR{Y jNj3jN zy ≤∈= Q  . (1)
For every output Rj ∈Q , there is an input requirement set ( )jNV Q . This is the set of all in-
puts jz  sufficient to produce jQ , in other words:
( ) ( ) }fR{V jNj2jjN zz ≤∈= QQ  .
6The boundary of the input requirement set is the isoquant for the output jQ .
4.2 Communication Costs
We assume that the individual production function can be written more specifically in the fol-
lowing way:
( ) ( ) ( )jjGjN cff zzz κ−=  .
The term ( )jGf z  is interpreted as the gross output that would be attainable in the absence of
communication costs. The function R:f 2G →Ω  is continuous, linear homogeneous and con-
cave. Moreover, both types of workers are assumed to be non-essential, so that ( ) 0f jG >z  for
( )0,1j =z , as well as for ( )1,0j =z . The output losses caused by communication costs are de-
noted by ( )jc zκ . The function R:c 2 →Ω  indicates the efficiency losses resulting for both
types of labour from the necessity to cooperate with workers of the other type.4 The scalar
0>κ  serves to parameterise the level of communication costs.
The function ( )⋅c  is continuous and linear homogeneous. Apart from this, our assumptions
concerning communication costs are very general.5 If only one type of worker is employed,
there will not be any output loss due to cultural interferences. We therefore assume ( ) 0c j =z
for all ( )0,jj A=z , as well as for all ( )jj ,0 B=z . On the other hand, if both types of labour are
used in the same production process, there will be output losses caused by the necessity to co-
ordinate. This is captured by assuming ( ) 0c j >z  for all 0z >>j .
If we consider two inputs ( )0,’ jj A=z  and ( )jj ,0’’ B=z  with 0, jj >BA , and any
( ) ’’1’ jjj zzz λ−+λ= , we have
( )( ) ( ) ( ) ( )’’f1’f’’1’f jNjNjjN zzzz λ−+λ<λ−+λ  , (2)
whenever
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( )
( ) 0c
’’f1’ff
j
j
N
j
N
j
N
>
λ−+λ−
>κ
z
zzz
. (3)
For sufficiently high values of κ , therefore, the net production function will no longer be
concave. Below we will always assume that κ  is high enough for this to be the case.
For lack of knowledge, we have put only few restrictions on the nature of communication
costs, and this carries over to the net production function. It is true that f N  is continuous and
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7linearly homogeneous. But the function will be neither necessarily monotonous, nor
differentiable, nor even positive throughout. Fig. 2 shows on the left a standard, linear
homogeneous concave gross production function of the CES-type and on the right a non-
concave net production function, resulting from sufficiently high communication costs. Fig. 3
shows some systems of isoquants that are consistent with our restrictions on technology.
The properties of the production set are easily derived from the characteristics of the produc-
tion function Nf . The set NY  is closed and represents a single output technology: For all( ) Njj Y, ∈−zQ  we have 0z ≥j . By (1) we have assumed free disposal of output: if a plan
( )jj , z−Q  is contained in NY , the same will be true for any plan ( )jj ,’ z−Q  with jj ’ QQ < . As
Nf  is linearly homogeneous, NY  exhibits constant returns to scale: from Nj Y∈y  follows
N
j Y∈yk  for all k ≥ 0. This also includes the possibility of inaction: the plan 0y =j , the so-
called zero-activity, is feasible. Geometrically, YN  is a cone with vertex at the origin. Factors
are productive and non-essential. In the set NY , production plans yielding a positive output
exist for ( )0,1j =z  as well as ( )1,0j =z . Ultimately, the technology is non-convex. There are
plans ’jy  and ’’jy  such that ( ) Njj Y’’1’ ∉λ−+λ yy for some scalar ] [1,0∈λ . This property is
crucial for our explanation of ethnically segregated economic sectors.
4.3 Price System and Profits
If Qp  represents the price of output and BA ,pp  are the wages for A-labour and B-labour, a
price system is defined by the vector:
3R∈p with ( )BAQ ,, ppp=p  .
The value of plan jy  with respect to the price system p  is the inner product of p  and jy :
jBjAjQj BpApQp −−=yp   .
The producers consider the price system as given. A profit-maximising plan solves the prob-
lem
jN
j Y
Max yp
y ∈
 .
Such a plan will not exist for every price system. For a given p , the value of an arbitrary pro-
duction plan will be positive, equal to zero or negative. If 0j >yp , the same will be true for
all production plans 0,j ≥kky  on the same ray through the origin, and potential profit is
unlimited. With constant returns, a solution to the problem of profit maximisation will exist if
and only if
0j ≤yp  for all 
N
j Y∈y   . (4)
The zero activity yields a profit of zero for any price system, so maximal profits cannot be
negative. Thus, if *jy  is a solution to the problem of profit maximisation, the standard zero
profit condition must hold:
80*j =yp  . (5)
In fact, conditions (4) and (5) are necessary and sufficient for a plan to be optimal. The first
condition makes sure that a maximum exists. If it holds, any plan is optimal that satisfies the
second condition.
4.4 Factor Supply and Factor Market Equilibrium
The model is closed by the assumption that the economy’s factor endowment, the stock
( )BA , zz=z , belongs to consumers who do not draw direct utility from their labour endow-
ment, whereas their preferences for the consumer good are insatiable. The profits of the pro-
ducers ultimately also accrue to the consumers.
An ordered set of feasible plans for the producers, ( )J1 ,, yy K  is a factor allocation. A factor
market equilibrium is defined as follows:
Definition 1: A price system 0* >>p  and a factor allocation ( )*,*, J1 yy K  with
( ) Njjj Y**,* ∈−= zy Q  is a factor market equilibrium, if
(1) for every producer j, the plan y j * solves jN
j Y
Max yp
y ∈
 , and (6)
(2) the factor market clears, i.e.: ∑
=
=
J
1j
j* zz . (7)
As only one good is produced, the role of the consumers is limited to ensuring the clearing of
the factor market and guaranteeing a strictly positive price system. A price 0Q ≤p  is ruled out
by the consumers being insatiable. If Qp  is positive, 0A ≤p  and 0B ≤p  are not possible.
Both factors are productive and nonessential, and if one of their prices were negative, produc-
ers could make arbitrary large profits, and their demand would be unbounded. Thus, if an
equilibrium exists, 0* >>p  must necessarily hold. The entire factor endowment will be sup-
plied and Walras’ law makes the market for output goods clear as well.
The investigation ultimately centres on the equilibrium structure of production, i.e. the proper-
ties of the production processes used in equilibrium. To this end, it is useful first to prove the
existence of equilibrium and then its efficiency. Having done this, it is surprisingly easy to
infer the properties of the production structure.
5. Existence and Efficiency
5.1 The Aggregate Production Set
If we consider a list of feasible production plans ( )J1 ,, yy K  and sum up, we obtain the aggre-
gate production vector y , consisting of an aggregate output Q and an aggregate input z :
( )zyy −== ∑
=
,
J
1j
j Q  .
9The set of all feasible aggregate production vectors is the aggregate production set Y. It is the
sum of the production sets NY  for the individual producers:
.j allfor  Y with  ,RYYY
J
1j
N
jj
3NN


 ∈=∈=++= ∑
=
yyyyK
As a counterpart to the production function Nf  for the individual firm, we define the aggre-
gate production function R:f 2 →Ω . For any given aggregate input, it indicates the maxi-
mum aggregate output that can supplied by the producers as a whole:
( ) ( )∑
=
=
J
1j
j
N
,,
fmaxf
J1
zz
zz K
   s.t. j0j ∀≥z    and   zz ≤∑
=
J
1j
j   .
The constraints define a bounded and closed set in JR . Furthermore, Nf  is continuous and the
Weierstrass theorem guarantees the existence of a maximum for any given 0z ≥ . Hence the
function f  is everywhere defined.
We will see that with constant returns, the aggregate production set is convex, even if the
technology of the individual producers is not. To this end, we first show that any aggregate
production vector can be written as the sum of not more than two individual production plans.
Lemma 1: Consider any number of production plans n1 y,,y K , 2≥n  in NY . Under the
given assumptions, there are two technologically feasible plans Iy  and IIy , such that
∑
=
+=
n
1j
IIIj yyy .
Proof: The sum ( ) ( )zzy −≡−=∑∑
==
,,
n
1j
jj
n
1j
j QQ  is a convex combination of feasible plans:
( ) ( )∑
=
−≡−
n
1j
j
j
ˆ,, zz QQ
QQ , with j
j
jˆ zz Q
Q
= . By construction, every jzˆ  belongs to the input requirement set
( )QNV . The aggregate input is a convex combination of the jzˆ . It lies in the polyhedron PO spanned by the
inputs ( )QNj Vˆ ∈z . The construction is illustrated by Fig. 4. We consider the line that connects z  and the origin,
}10{S ≤≤= ssz . Line S necessarily contains points on the border of PO. Any such point can be written as a
convex combination of at most two of the points that span the polyhedron. There will be scalars [ ]1,0∈s ,
[ ]1,0∈λ  and inputs ki ˆ,ˆ zz  in ( )QNV , such that ( ) ki ˆ1ˆ zzz λ−+λ=s . This means: ( ) zzz =λ−+λ ki ˆ11ˆ1
ss
. The
inputs iˆ
1
z
s
λ  and ( ) kˆ11 z
s
λ−  are sufficient to produce an amount QQ
s
≥1 . Because of free disposal, Q  can also
be produced. Thus we can write the aggregate production as the sum of two production plans both contained in
NY : ( ) ( ) 


−λ−+


−λ=− ki zzz ˆ
1
,1ˆ1,,
s
Q
s
QQ . n
The Lemma directly leads to
Proposition 1: Under the assumptions on NY  and for 2≥J , the aggregate production set is
convex.
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Proof: Let ’y  and ’’y  be any aggregate production vectors in Y. The convex combination ( ) ’’1’ yyy λ−+λ=  is
the sum of Jn 2=  production plans in NY . Lemma 1 states that there are two plans Iy  and IIy  with
III yyy += . Therefore Y∈y . n
There is a close connection between sets of profit-maximising individual production plans,
and profit-maximising aggregate production vectors:
Lemma 2:6 Let J1 y,,y K  be production plans in NY . For any given p , the aggregate pro-
duction vector ∑
=
=
J
1j
jyy  maximizes aggregate profit yp  in Y  if and only if jy  is profit
maximising in NY  for every producer. n
If a factor allocation maximises aggregate profits, every production plan involved will maxi-
mise the individual profit, and vice versa. As we search for an equilibrium, we can proceed in
two steps. First, we can interpret the whole sector as a single, profit-maximising firm that
nonetheless acts as a price taker. Then, having found an equilibrium production vector and an
appropriate price system, we can decentralise the allocation.
5.2 The Efficiency of Equilibrium
An aggregate production vector is efficient if there is no Y∈y’  such that yy’> , i.e. if it is not
possible to have a higher output using the same input and if the same output cannot be pro-
duced with less input. It is readily shown that if an aggregate production vector y  maximises
profits in Y  for any price system 0p >> , this y  must be efficient.7 Together with Lemma 1,
this leads to a stripped down version of the first fundamental theorem of welfare economics:
Lemma 3: If ( )** J1 y,,y K  and 0* >>p  is a factor market equilibrium, then the aggregate
production vector ∑
=
J
1j
j *y  is efficient.
5.3 The Existence of Equilibrium
The search for equilibrium can thus be limited to allocations that lead to efficient aggregate
productions. First it has to be checked whether there is an aggregate production vector that is
both efficient and uses up the entire endowment. Then we have to ask for the existence of a
price system *p  that supports the efficient aggregate production vector. If the answers to both
questions are positive, we can conclude that an equilibrium exists.8 The first question is ad-
dressed by
                                                
6 See e.g. Debreu (1959).
7 See e.g. Mas-Collel et alt. (1995), S. 150.
8 Existence can also be shown by invoking Debreu’s (1959) theorem on the existence of equilibria in competi-
tive economies. The route taken here is analytically less demanding and yields valuable qualitative informa-
tion on the nature of equilibrium at the same time.
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Lemma 4: Under the given assumptions on NY , the aggregate production set contains an
efficient production vector ( )zy −= ,Q , with ( )zf=Q  and 0z >>  being the aggregate factor
endowment.
Proof: For every z  – and for zz =  in particular – the maximum attainable output exists. Consider the aggre-
gate production vector ( )zy −= ,Q  with ( )zf=Q . It is efficient if the same output cannot be produced using an
aggregate input zz < . Now if less input could be used, a quantity 0>−= zzz∆  would be redundant. Because
all factors are productive and nonessential, further producers K,2J,1J ++  could produce additional output using
z∆ . Lemma 1, however, guarantees that an aggregate production vector based on an arbitrary number of feasible
production plans can be realised by just 2 producers. So if Q  is the maximum output given z , there can be no
redundant factor quantities. n
As every factor market equilibrium is efficient and, furthermore, one and only one efficient
aggregate output vector exists, we have to look for a price system p * that makes y  a profit-
maximising vector. Part a) of the following Lemma is a version of the Second Fundamental
Theorem of Welfare Economics. The proof is well known and rests on the Separation Theo-
rem for convex sets.9 Part b) uses the properties of the technology assumed here:
Lemma 5: Let Y be a convex production set and y  be an efficient aggregate production vec-
tor in Y .
a) Then a price system 0p >  exists, for which y  maximises aggregate profits.
b) If factors are productive and nonessential, returns to scale are constant, and 0>>y , this
price system satisfies 0p >> .
Proof for part b): Let ( ) 0,, BAQ >= pppp  be a price system that makes y a profit-maximising production
vector. Then Qp  must be positive, as for ( ) 0,,0 BA >= ppp , the use of 0z >>  would not be profit-maximising.
But then both factor prices must be positive. None of the factors is essential: if one of them were free, producers
could always increase profits by using more of it. n
This leads immediately to
Proposition 2: Under the given assumptions on NY , for any aggregate endowment z  a factor
market equilibrium, consisting of an allocation ( )** J1 y,,y K  and a price system 0* >>p
exists. The aggregate production vector ∑ *jy  is efficient.
Proof: Lemma 2 limits the search for equilibrium to those allocations that lead to efficient aggregate production
vectors. Lemma 3 shows that there is exactly one efficient aggregate production vector y  that uses z . Lemma 4
guarantees, together with Proposition 1, that there is a price system 0* >>p  for which y  maximises aggregate
profit. If ( )**1 Jy,,yA* K=  is an allocation with yy =∑
=
*
J
1j
j , then for *p  every single production plan must be
profit-maximising. Every such pair ( )*Ap*,  is thus a factor market equilibrium. n
                                                
9 See e.g. Mas-Collel et al. (1995), p. 151, Takayama (1985), p. 56, or Koopmans (1957), p. 88.
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6. Uniform and Multiple Productive Structures
The aggregate production set is convex, but not so the production sets of the individual pro-
ducers. What are the consequences? The set Y  contains the individual technology NY  en-
tirely. But not vice versa. In the aggregate, production vectors are possible that are not feasible
individually. If any such aggregate production vector is realised, then the individual plans
must differ from each other by more than just a scaling factor.
We call unit activity any feasible production plan that leads to one unit of output:( )ujuj ,1 zy −= , with 0uj >z . Any production plan can be written as a scalar product ujjj yy q=
of the quantity of output and a unit activity. In describing an allocation ( )uJJu11 y,,yA qq K= ,
we speak of a uniform productive structure if all producers use the same unit activity, i.e. if
u
J
u
1 yy ==K . A multiple productive structure, on the other hand, is realised if the allocation
makes use of at least two different unit activities. Let ( )zy −= ,Q  be the efficient aggregate
production vector, with ( )zf=Q . Then we can make the following case distinction:
Case 1: ( ) ( ) Q== zz ff N   .
That means, NY∈y . Factors can be efficiently utilised by individual producers in the propor-
tion given by z . Then every allocation




= yyA QQQQ
1
,,
1
* J1 K with 0j ≥Q  for all j and QQ =∑
=
J
1j
j
constitutes an equilibrium, together with a suitable price system *p . If technology were con-
vex on the firm level, this would always be the case.
Case 2: ( ) ( ) Q=< zz ff N  .
Then, obviously, NY∉y . Individual producers are not able to use the factors efficiently in the
proportion given by z . Because technology is non-convex on the firm level, there certainly
are such factor proportions. Moreover, inequalities (2) and (3) show that for any factor pro-
portion 0>>z , there is a level of communication costs high enough to make this the relevant
case.
The equilibrium allocation is efficient. Therefore, in case 2 at least two different unit activities
must be in active use. They satisfy the zero-profit condition: j0* uj ∀=yp . All profit-
maximising unit activities lie on a hyperplane that supports Y and goes through the origin.
The aggregate production vector lies in the interior of the cone spanned by the ujy .
Let us now return to Fig. 1, which depicts the input space in equilibrium. By the equation
0* uj =yp , the price system determines a unit cost line consisting of all inputs worth one unit
of output. This line supports the input requirement set ( )1VN , and it contains all profit-
maximising unit inputs. It also contains the "average" input of the economy, z⋅Q1 . The latter
is a convex combination of the unit activities used in equilibrium:
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∑
=
⋅=⋅
J
Q
Q
Q 1j
u
j
j1
zz  .
For the isoquant drawn with a bold line, there are two profit-maximising unit inputs, Iz  and
IIz . In this case, the quantities produced by means of these activities are uniquely determined.
The dashed isoquant shows a case in which there are not just two, but three profit-maximising
activities. The equilibrium quantities are not fully determined. A dualistic productive
structure, however, must be regarded as the typical case: The efficient aggregate production
can always be realised by using just two unit activities. An additional profit-maximising unit
activity, however, is restricted to lie on the same supporting hyperplane as uIy  and uIIy .
Under what conditions will a multiple productive structure be realised? To begin with, the
condition ( ) ( )zz ff N <  shows that, with a given technology, the composition of the aggregate
factor endowment is decisive. If the allocation of labour in the proportion given by aggregate
endowment leads to high communication costs at the firm level, then multiple unit activities
are needed, normally two. The labour force is segregated at the workshop level. Furthermore,
a uniform productive structure will be inefficient for any composition of factor endowment, if
communication costs are sufficiently high. Therefore, for a given composition of the labour
force, it depends on the level of communication costs whether a multiple productive structure
will result or not.
7. A Simple Theorem of Nonsubstitution
Now we have to work out a special feature of equilibria characterised by a multiple productive
structure. Within certain bounds, the real wages, as well as the efficient unit activities, are
invariant with respect to changes in the aggregate factor endowment. Let the composition of
z  be such that a multiple productive structure is needed, and let 0* >>p  be an equilibrium
price system. Then 0* j ≤yp  for all 
N
j Y∈y . The set M collects all profit-maximising unit
activities given *p :
( ) }0with,,1Y{M uuuNu =−=∈= y*pzyy .
By assumption, M contains at least two elements. The activities in M span a convex cone C of
aggregate production vectors:




∈≥=∈= ∑
=
J
1j
u
jj
u
jj
3 M,0with ,RC yyyy QQ  .
This cone is depicted in Fig. 5. Every aggregate production vector contained in C is profit-
maximising given the price system *p , and therefore efficient. We have:
Proposition 3: Let y  be any aggregate production vector in the interior of C. Then
a) all unit activities used in equilibrium will be contained in M, and
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b) every unit activity in M may be used in equilibrium.
Proof: a) C∈y  maximises aggregate profits for *p . Every unit activity ujy  used to produce y  must be profit-
maximising itself, i.e. Muj ∈y . b) The convex cone C is spanned by two10 linearly independent unit activities in
M that may be labelled uIy  und 
u
IIy . If an aggregate production vector lies in the interior of the cone, there will
be scalars 0, III >QQ  with
u
IIII
u
II yyy QQ += with 0, III >QQ . (8)
If M does not contain any further unit activity besides uIy  and 
u
IIy , the assertion is proved. Now let 
uyˆ  be some
unit activity in M not identical with either uIy  or 
u
IIy . Then 
uyˆ  lies in the interior of C. The subsets defined be-
low are a partition of the interior of C:
}0ˆ0ˆˆ{C IuuIIA >∧>+= QQQQ yy ; }0ˆˆˆ{C uB >= QQ y ; }00ˆˆˆ{C IIuIIIIuB >∧>+= QQQQ yy .
Every y  in the interior of C is contained in one of these subsets and can be written as a linear combination of uyˆ
and other unit activities with 0ˆ >Q . Fig 6 illustrates the argument. n
The aggregate production vectors in the interior of C are closely related: Each one is optimal
for the same (normalised) price system - and only for this price system. If one thinks of the
production side of the economy as a representative firm, the price system makes the firm in-
different between all the production vectors represented as points in C.
Proposition 4: Let y  be any aggregate production vector in the interior of C. The price sys-
tem *p  for which y  maximises aggregate profits is uniquely determined up to a scalar, and it
is the same price system for all y .
Proof: The existence of a price system *p  already follows from the definitions of C and M.
As in (8) above, every y  in the interior of C can be written as a linear combination of two unit
activities from M with positive coefficients. For every *p , therefore, both uIy  and uIIy  must
be profit-maximising, i.e., 0*0* uu =∧= III ypyp . These are two linearly dependent equa-
tions for the prices *Qp , *Ap  and *Bp . If we normalise by *Qp , there can be no more than
one equilibrium price system. n
The graphical representation of factor market equilibrium in Fig. 1 makes this obvious. Real
wages are uniquely determined. There cannot be a second isocost line that both leads through
z⋅Q1  and supports the input requirement set ( )1V . This holds true for all factor endowments
in the interior of the cone spanned by Iz  and IIz .
Consider the projection of C onto the input space, ZC . The set ZC  is also a cone; it contains
all aggregate inputs that belong to the aggregate production vectors in C. If we vary the factor
endowment within the bounds of ZC , the production sector behaves similar to a Leontief sys-
tem with substitution possibilities. The real factor prices remain constant, just as the profit-
                                                
10 M contains at least two different unit activities, so ( ) 2Cdim ≥ . On the other hand, ( ) 2Cdim ≤ , because all
unit activities in M are contained in a supporting hyperplane given by the equation 0u =py .
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maximising activities. Thus we can state that Propositions 3 and 4 constitute a local Nonsub-
stitution Theorem11 for the case of a multiple productive structure.
Every competitive equilibrium that uses an aggregate input within the cone ZC  is character-
ised by the same efficient unit activities and by the same real wages. The results remain valid
in a model with real wage-dependent factor supply. We also can generalise to a situation with
convex technologies and constant returns, in which more than two primary factors are used.12
The simple model of industry structure described above makes two assertions on economies
characterised by ethnic dualism. First, the propensity of the workforce to segregate on the firm
level is high if workers are characterised by major cultural differences. The complementarities
given by comparative advantages are then countervailed by interferences due to high co-ordi-
nation costs, and a separation of the workforce into two (or more) sectors becomes efficient.
The approach thus gives us an explanation and interpretation of dualistic economic structures.
Second, if a multiple productive structure prevails, the aggregate production set is linear in
the neighbourhood of the equilibrium production vector. As the aggregate factor input
composition varies, this will be accommodated by sectoral output quantities, not the factor
intensities on the firm level. As long as the economy stays in the dualistic regime, the wage
structure will be independent of the composition of the labour force.
8. Generalisations and Outlook
We have to add some points that have not been mentioned before. Communication costs are
not the only inhomogeneity costs capable of causing nonconvexities on the firm level and a
dualistic industry structure. Similar to the Schelling (1978) model of residential segregation,
direct externalities between workers could depress productivity or make workers demand
higher wages. Furthermore, certain indivisibilites might have to be adjusted in a way that suits
the productivity of either one or the other type of labour. Examples might be the company lan-
guage, the form of organisation or the intensity of IT use. Rosen (1978) has put it this way:
The often observed fact that a factory in one country is more productive than its identical twin in another
country can arise because work assignments embodied in the design of capital are optimal for one labour
force and not for another owing to differences in the distribution of worker skills and comparative ad-
vantage.
                                                
11 See e.g. Mas-Collel et al. (1995), pp. 157-160. The Nonsubstitution Theorem was derived by Samuelson
(1951), pp. 142-146, and refers to systems of nested production processes with n output goods, but only one
primary input. Samuelson assumes continuous, linearly homogeneous production functions and shows that
with efficient production, the activities used in production are independent of the composition of output. The
same holds true for equilibrium prices. If the composition of output varies, substitution takes place solely by
adapting the level on which the efficient activities are used. An important difference remains: the Nonsub-
stitution theorem by Samuelson makes an assertion on systems with one primary input and several output
goods, whereas the Propositions 3 and 4 assume one final good and several primary inputs.
12 Let k be the number of factors. We have to suppose kJ ≥  as to the number of producers. After generalising
proposition 1 in a straightforward fashion, all propositions hold mutatis mutandis. Yet, without further as-
sumptions, a dualistic productive structure can no longer be regarded as typical.
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Another issue is that the technological assumptions might seem overly restrictive. However,
the argument is easily generalised. First, let us introduce capital in a way that leaves the basic
conclusions intact. Let
( )jjNj ,f BAW =
be the labour input of producer j, measured in efficiency units. The function Nf  is assumed to
have the same properties as before. Together with capital jK , the labour services are used for
the production of the output good, as described by the following meta production function:
( )jjNj ,WKgy =   .
The function Ng  is assumed to be linearly homogeneous and weakly concave. If marginal re-
turns to jK  and jW  in the meta function Ng  are decreasing everywhere, it is easy to see that
the compound production function will be linearly homogeneous with decreasing marginal re-
turns with respect to every factor. In a factor market equilibrium with a dualistic productive
structure there will be two types of producers: those that combine capital mainly with labour
of type A and those that specialise in using labour of type B, both employing the two types in
fixed proportions. Relative wages are still invariant to small changes in the aggregate labour
endowment. Absolute wages will decrease due to an influx of migrant workers, if the economy
in question is closed. In a small open economy with capital mobility, however, the price of
capital is given by the world market interest rate, and an influx of migrant workers will be ac-
companied by a corresponding inflow of capital from abroad.
Second, the limitation to one single output can be dispensed with. If we suppose a number of
different goods to be produced by a single output technology of the form ( )⋅Nf , the intervals
ZC  of inefficient factor proportions will vary from one good to the other, as well as the re-
spective rates of substitution in the regimes of multiple productive structures. In equilibrium,
however, there will be but one relative wage. Any sector will be in one of three states: (a) Pro-
ducers use labour of type A intensively, or (b): the sector is characterised by a multiple pro-
ductive structure, or (c): it mainly uses labour of type B. Relating relative wages to the pro-
portion AB  of labour endowment in the economy will yield a curve that decreases monoto-
nously, as one sector after the other switches from state (a) to state (c). But because of con-
vexity of aggregate technology, every such switch involves an interval where the sector is situ-
ated in a dualistic regime (b). There, rates of substitution are constant and variations of aggre-
gate labour supply are absorbed by accommodating the level of two or more different efficient
activities. As long as one sector of the economy is in a dualistic regime, it acts to sterilise the
wage structure from supply shocks.
All this is good news with respect to the impact of migration as a consequence of EU en-
largement. There are, however, further issues involved. We have shown that the propensity of
the labour force to segregate on the workshop level depends on the level of communication
costs. A high level of communication costs resulting form marked cultural differences means
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that the two types of labour are segregated almost completely in the various sectors of the
economy. This, however, is not favourable to a smooth assimilation of the migrants in their
new socio-economic environment. Assimilation is a process of social learning, and work is
very important for the diffusion of knowledge, ideas and values. In von Kalckreuth (1999a
and b) we show that a slow rate of diffusion in a dualistic economy leads to sluggish growth
and a highly unequal income distribution.13 This means that the presence of strong cultural
and economic differences in a dualistic economy may be conducive to internal structures that
are the basis for their very persistence.
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